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Abstract—This paper studies entry and capacity decisions by dialysis
providers in the United States. We estimate a structural model where
providers make continuous strategic choices of capacity based on their
private information about own costs and knowledge of the distribution
of competitors’ private information. We evaluate the impact on the mar-
ket structure and providers’ profits under counterfactual regulatory policies
that increase the costs or reduce the payment per unit of capacity. We find
that these policies reduce the market capacity as measured by the number
of dialysis stations. However, the downward-sloping reaction curve shields
some providers from negative profit shocks in certain markets. The paper
also has a methodological contribution in that it proposes new estimators
for Bayesian games with continuous actions.
I. Introduction
DIALYSIS is the major treatment for more than 630,000patients in the United States with end-stage renal dis-
ease (ESRD). Medicare, the monopolistic buyer of dialysis
services, spent $8.6 billion in 2007 on the treatment and med-
ication of dialysis patients. While Medicare pays a fixed rate
to dialysis providers, rising dialysis expenditure motivates a
recent Medicare reform that aims at reducing costs and main-
taining the quality of care.1 The core component of the reform
is a new reimbursement system that incorporates payments
for multiple drugs and services furnished in a dialysis ses-
sion into a single bundled rate. This effectively reduces the
average per treatment rate received by dialysis providers and
subsequently lowers the per patient margin. Lowering the
dialysis reimbursement rate also raises the concern of insuf-
ficient payment, which may eventually compromise dialysis
accessibility. Dialysis capacity, as measured by the number
of dialysis stations, is an important metric that policymakers
use to evaluate the adequacy of dialysis payment policies.
In this paper, we analyze the provision of dialysis capacity
and evaluate the implications of counterfactual dialysis pay-
ment policies. Our results offer some insights into the conduct
of health care providers and the effectiveness of fixed-price
regulation.
We build a model of static Bayesian games with contin-
uous actions to examine the strategic interactions between
U.S. dialysis providers in their choices of capacity across
Hospital Service Areas (HSA) in 2007. We focus on three
types of providers on the market: FMC, DaVita, and all other
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1 The reform was proposed in 2008 and became effective in 2011. The
full implementation of the policy was completed in 2014.
nonchain providers.2 We estimate how payoffs of these
providers depend on exogenous market characteristics (such
as size and measures of ESRD risks) as well as the endoge-
nous choices of capacity. We then use our estimates to predict
the impact of payment policies that either raise or reduce the
margin per unit of capacity. In particular, we are interested in
how different providers would respond to positive or negative
adjustment in the reimbursement for dialysis treatment and
whether high capacity helps dialysis providers maintain their
market presence with lower margins.
The impact of strategic choices of capacity on the market
structure and the intensity of competition has been stud-
ied in several theoretical papers (Dixit, 1980; Gelman &
Salop, 1983; Kreps & Scheinkman 1983). The empirical
literature, however, has largely ignored the strategic incen-
tives in the continuous choices of capacity. With little price
and quality competition (as shown in Grieco & McDevitt,
2013, and Cutler et al., 2012), these strategic incentives
are important for dialysis providers.3 In practice, a dialysis
provider’s margin decreases in the capacity of competitors.
One explanation for this pattern is that additional capacity
allows a provider to offer a more flexible treatment schedule,
which patients highly value.4 Given the high operation and
maintenance costs for each dialysis station, optimal capac-
ity choices depend on the trade-off among market demand,
capacity costs, and competitive interactions between dialysis
providers.
We characterize providers’ strategies in a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium by the first-order conditions of their constrained
maximization problems (subject to the constraints of non-
negative capacity). We show that these conditions are similar
to censored regressions, except that the expected capacity
for competitors in equilibrium now enters as a “generated”
regressor. We propose several estimators (two-stage, MLE,
and GMM) to infer the marginal effects of a provider’s own
capacity, the capacity of its competitors, and the market
conditions on its profits.
Our estimates conform to the empirical regularities that
a dialysis provider’s choice of capacity is decreasing in its
2 Fresenius Medical Care (FEC) and DaVita are the industry leaders with
national footprints. They jointly own two-thirds of the dialysis facilities
and treat more than two-thirds of all dialysis patients. We refer to other
non-FMC or non-DaVita providers as nonchain providers. The scale of
operation and the market penetration of each of these nonchain providers
are not comparable to the two leaders.
3 Both Grieco and McDevitt (2014) and Cutler, Dafny, and Ody (2012)
find little effect of competition on various measures of dialysis quality and
patient outcomes.
4 Given that a typical dialysis patient visits providers three times a week
for a total of nine to twelve hours, the scheduling flexibility is found to be
more important than the survival rate in patient’s dialysis choice (Johansen,
2011). It is easier for patients to find their preferred appointments with the
providers capable of performing multiple concurrent dialysis sessions.
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competitors’ choices of capacity (i.e., the reaction curve is
downward sloping) and that competition is more intense
between competitors with high capacity. We find that all
else being equal, increasing a provider’s expected capacity
by 1 unit (a dialysis station) reduces a competitor’s choice
of capacity by an average of 0.2 to 0.4 units and decreases
the competitor’s entry probability by 3% to 13% in equilib-
rium. This suggests that focusing on providers’ binary entry
decisions overlooks rather substantial strategic interactions
between their choices of capacity. Our results are also robust
to various sample selection criteria and different methods
of econometric implementation (such as two-stage, nested
maximum-likelihood, and GMM).
In our counterfactual analyses, we find that on average,
providers’ capacity choices respond negatively to a reduc-
tion in the profit margin that results from a more stringent
reimbursement policy. The effects are reversed under more
generous reimbursement policies that increase the profit mar-
gin. More interesting, the responses are heterogeneous across
markets and providers. For example, FMC and nonchain
independent providers respond most strongly to both negative
and positive margin adjustments, while DaVita reacts mildly
in both cases. In some markets, DaVita reduces (increases)
its capacity when the margin widens (shrinks) by the same
portion as its competitors. Such a pattern is explained by the
downward-sloping reaction curve in the Bayesian game of
capacity choices, which incentivizes DaVita to decrease its
capacity if the competitors expand and increase its capacity
if others scale down. Our results show that the effects of the
reaction curve are large enough to offset the impact of posi-
tive (negative) adjustments in the profit margins in certain
markets. This offers evidence that the shape of the reac-
tion curve could potentially magnify a provider’s response
to small changes in the profit margin in some markets and
that it plays a crucial role in determining the effect of
reimbursement policies.
Apart from its empirical motivation and findings, our paper
also contributes to the methodological literature on the esti-
mation of empirical games. We are not aware of any previous
work structurally estimating Bayesian games with continu-
ous actions. The bulk of existing literature studies competitive
effects in games with discrete actions in various contexts
such as entry games, where alternatives available to play-
ers are naturally finite (Aradillas-Lopez, 2010; Bajari et al.,
2010; Berry & Tamer, 2006; Davis, 2006; Mazzeo, 2002;
Seim, 2006; Sweeting, 2009). In our application, binary entry
decisions are closely associated with continuous choices of
capacity, suggesting that even small incremental changes in
capacity play an important role in determining the firms’ pay-
offs and the market outcomes. One of the main messages
of our paper is that overlooking the information revealed in
the chosen level of capacity may compromise researchers’
understanding of the market mechanism.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the background of the dialysis industry. Section
III specifies the econometric model for our structural analy-
sis. Section IV discusses the identification and estimation of
the model. Section V describes the data. Section VI presents
empirical findings and results from the counterfactual exer-
cises. Section VII concludes.
II. Background
A. Dialysis and Capacity
Chronic kidney disease (CKD) affects more than 20 mil-
lion adults in the United States. The advanced stage of CKD,
known as end-stage renal disease (ESRD), is most commonly
caused by diabetes and high blood pressure. The only treat-
ment for it is dialysis or a kidney transplant. Given the limited
supply of donor organs and the surgical risk associated with
comorbidity, many ESRD patients rely on routine dialysis as
the major treatment.
Dialysis removes waste (such as urea) and excess water
from the body as a replacement for lost kidney function.
Hemodialysis is the most common treatment modality and
accounts for about 90% of the dialysis population in the
United States.5 In a hemodialysis session, a dialysis machine
pumps a patient’s blood into the dialyzer, cleans it with
dialysate (a solution that removes excess fluids and wastes),
and injects the cleaned blood back into the patient’s body. It
is impossible to perform dialysis without those machines.
Acquiring and operating a dialysis machine is costly. A
new dialysis machine costs between $10,000 and $15,000
and has a life span of five to seven years. Among the asso-
ciated costs are dialysis chairs and privacy screens. Industry
experts estimate a cost of $100,000 to maintain and operate
one dialysis station over its lifetime. The dialysis capacity in
a given market (HSA), as measured by the number of dialy-
sis stations operated, is practically a permanent decision for
each dialysis provider; the data available typically report lit-
tle subsequent adjustment in capacity by providers following
initial entry into a market. Grieco and McDevitt (2014) find
that dialysis capacity remained constant for over 90% of the
dialysis facilities in the United States between 2004 and 2007.
B. Regulatory Background
ESRD patients receive almost universal coverage under
Medicare regardless of their age.6 Around 80% of the dialy-
sis population relies on Medicare as the primary payer (U.S.
Renal Data System, 2010). Under the old system, Medi-
care reimbursed three dialysis sessions per week under a
fixed rate, after adjusting for the patient’s case mix, local
wages, and other factors associated with the cost of treat-
ment. In addition, providers are paid for separately billable
services that are furnished during the in-center hemodialysis
sessions (e.g., injectable drugs such as Epogen and diagnostic
5 Alternatively, about 10% of the dialysis population chooses peritoneal
dialysis, which patients usually perform every day at home.
6 ESRD was recognized as disability under the Medicare Reform Act in
1972. The legislation was signed into law and became effective in 1973.
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laboratory tests), which represent about 40% of total Medi-
care payments per dialysis treatment session. The generous
reimbursement for separately billable services has raised the
concern that it may create distorted profit incentives for the
overuse of drugs. For example, one of the separately bill-
able drugs, Epogen, primarily used for treating a common
complication of ESRD, cost $2.1 billion in 2008 and has
become Medicare’s largest drug expenditure. DaVita, one
of the largest chain dialysis providers, was investigated for
overbilling dialysis drugs.7 Thamer et al. (2007) found that
large profit-seeking chain facilities used larger doses of
Epogen and suggested this was due to the profit incentives.
The excessive use of such drugs not only increased Medicare
costs but also raised cardiovascular risk (e.g., heart attack,
stroke) and subsequently lowered the life quality of ESRD
patients.
In 2008, Medicare proposed a new payment system, elim-
inating the drug incentive by incorporating separate billable
items into an expanded bundled payment.8 Additionally, pay-
for-performance quality incentives were introduced under
the new system. Dialysis providers whose quality of service
(as measured by patients’ hemoglobin and urea levels) fails
to meet standards could be penalized with a rate reduction of
up to 2%. The new dialysis payment system became effective
in 2011, and full implementation took place in 2014.
The new Medicare reimbursement rule could have a signif-
icant impact on dialysis providers. The Government Account-
ability Office estimates $880 million in savings on dialysis
payments.9 Our counterfactual experiments are motivated by
this reform and investigate how dialysis providers respond to
different adjustments in the reimbursement rate.
C. Dialysis Market
The dialysis market in the United States can be charac-
terized as a duopoly market. In 2007, DaVita and Fresenius
Medical Care (FMC), the two largest national chains, treated
over 66% of dialysis patients (31% by DaVita versus 35%
by FMC) and owned around 66% of the dialysis facilities
(30% by DaVita and 36% by FMC).10 Both chains grew sig-
nificantly after a series of consolidations in the 2000s. In
2004, DaVita bought Gambro, which owned over 550 facili-
ties, and in 2005, FMC bought Renal Care Group with more
than 450 facilities.11 Overall, the mergers between 2004 and
2006 consolidated the six largest chains into two. As of 2007,
the market has been dominated by these two major chain
providers.
7 In 2006, 25% of DaVita’s revenue came from Epogen. The government
decided not to pursue the case in 2011.
8 For example, the Medicare base rate per dialysis session was $133.81,
while it was $229.63 under the 2008 proposal. Note that the proposed
base rate incorporates all separable billable services, including lab test and
injectable drugs.
9 http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2012/12/24/gvsd1226.htm.
10 U.S. Renal Data System (2009).
11 The merger between FMC and Renal Care Group was announced in
May 2005 and completed in March 2006.
We focus on three types of dialysis providers: FMC,
DaVita, and all other providers (referred to as nonchain
providers). Given the proximity in the time frame between
2004 and 2006 when these major consolidations and sub-
sequent market reorganization took place, we believe that
the decisions of providers can be treated as made simultane-
ously. Using information on the capacity of dialysis providers
between 2004 and 2009, we find that both DaVita and FMC
adjusted their choices of capacity in the acquired facilities
immediately following the merger and that capacity in the
acquired facilities has barely changed since 2007. These facts
offer evidence that the providers’ choices of capacity reported
in data should be interpreted as equilibrium outcomes.
III. A Model of Capacity Choices with Private
Information
We now specify a model of simultaneous Bayesian games
with continuous actions. Consider a market that is served
by N providers competing through the choices of capacity.
A provider (firm) i’s profit from choosing capacity Ki in a
market m, as measured by the number of dialysis stations, is
given by
Πi,m(Ki,m, K−i,m, Xm, εi,m)
= Ki,mπi(Xm, K−i,m, εi,m) − ci(Ki,m). (1)
The function πi(Xm, K−i,m, εi,m) is the variable profit for i per
unit in capacity (a provider’s variable profit per unit in a mar-
ket is defined as the ratio between its gross profits before
subtracting the fixed costs in ci and its total capacity in that
market.) It depends on the vector of competitors’ capacity
K−i,m ≡ (Kj,m)j =i, market characteristics Xm, and an idiosyn-
cratic profit component εi,m, which is i’s private information.
We assume εi,m are independent across providers conditional
on Xm. To simplify notation, we drop the subscript m below.
An implication of the specification is that the gross variable
profit for a provider is proportional to its choice of capac-
ity. This is motivated by the observation that each dialysis
machine receives a flat rate from Medicare for each treatment.
A typical dialysis patient receives three treatments per week,
each lasting for about 4 hours. An additional hour is needed
for setting up and cleaning the machine per treatment. This
sums to 15 hours per week. On average, a dialysis machine
treats three to five patients per week. During a treatment,
operating staff such as registered nurses and technicians need
to oversee the process and perform routine checks. Given
the fixed rate for a dialysis treatment, it is plausible that a
provider’s variable profit is approximately proportional to
its dialysis capacity, as measured by the number of dialysis
stations.
We adopt a linear specification of per unit variable profit
πi,
πi(X, K−i, εi) = Xβi +
∑
j =i
γi,jKj − εi,
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where γi,j are heterogeneous marginal effects of j’s capacity
on i’s per unit variable profits. There are two reasons for this
simplistic specification.
First, this linear specification for πi can be interpreted as a
practical reduced-form approximation (regression) of actual
variable profit per unit in capacity in the data-generating pro-
cess. Using this as a benchmark helps us to understand how
strategic capacity choices determine market outcome and
firms’ profits. As we show in section VI, this specification
explains a large portion of the variation in capacity choices
reported in the data. It is worth noting that a provider’s own
capacity is not included in the specification for per capacity
variable profits πi. This means the gross variable profits are
proportional rather than quadratic in a provider’s own capac-
ity. Such proportionality is mostly motivated by the inelastic
market demand for dialysis treatment and Medicare’s fixed
rates for dialysis treatment.
Second, focusing on this linear specification allows us
to establish the identification of marginal effects of market
characteristics on profits. In principle, we could extend our
estimation algorithm in section IV to a richer structural model
(such as one with market-level unobserved heterogeneity) in
order to fit the data better. Yet this is known to raise new
challenges with the identification of structural parameters—
in particular, the marginal effects of capacity and market
conditions on providers’ profits.
The firm-specific fixed cost is given by
ci(Ki) = aiK2i + biKi, where ai > 0.
We adopt a quadratic cost specification for the following
reasons. First, the assumption of constant scale of economy
(i.e., costs are linear in capacity) is not plausible in the dial-
ysis industry. Adding a dialysis station not only involves
significant investment but also requires additional space,
maintenance, and personnel (e.g., technicians, nurses), whose
supply is relatively inelastic. The quadratic form is helpful to
capture such features as well. Second, quadratic costs take a
flexible nonlinear form and thus can be considered a second-
order polynomial approximation to more complicated cost
structures. Our estimation algorithm in section IV can be
extended to allow higher-order polynomials in the specifica-
tion. Finally, that there is no constant term in the quadratic
function is due to the need for a location normalization:
profits from no entry (Ki = 0) need to be 0.
We assume that choices of capacity in the data are ratio-
nalized by providers’ strategies in a pure strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (PBNE). A pure strategy for a provider i is
a mapping from its information set (X, εi) into the support for
capacity (R+). A profile of pure strategies {K∗i (.)}i∈N forms
a PBNE if
K∗i (X , εi)
= arg max
Ki∈R+
Eε−i
[
Πi(Ki, K∗−i(X, ε−i), X, εi)|X, εi
]
, (2)
where K∗−i(X, ε−i) is shorthand for {K∗j (X, εj) : j = i}. The
case with Ki = 0 means that provider i decides not to enter
the market. The existence of PBNE in our model follows
from theorem 3 in Athey (2001) and the fact that the cross-
derivatives of the ex post profit for i with respect to realized
choices of capacity (Ki, Kj) and (Ki, εj) are constants.
Next, we derive the first-order condition for PBNE, the
foundation for our estimators. We maintain a conventional
regularity condition that ensures the order of differentiation
and integration in ∂
∂Ki
Eε−i
[
Πi(Ki, K−i(X, ε−i), X, εi)|X, εi
]
can be switched for all i and vectors of admissible strategies
K−i(X, ε−i).
Proposition 1. Under the model assumptions above,
K∗i (X, εi) = max
⎧⎨⎩0, 12ai⎛⎝Xβi +∑
j =i
γi,jEεj
[
K∗j (X, εj)|X, εi
]− bi − εi
⎞⎠⎫⎬⎭
(3)
in any PBNE.
This proposition has a couple of key implications for esti-
mation. First, it implies that the scale of ai, bi, βi, γi,j and the
distribution of εi cannot be jointly recovered from equation
(3). Hence without loss of generality, we set ai = 1/2 as
a necessary scale normalization.12 Second, the equilibrium
condition in equation (3) is similar to a single-agent censored
regression, except that a subvector of its regressors now con-
sists of equilibrium objects {Eεj [K∗j |x, εi] : j = i}. Thus,
the model lends itself to a standard maximum likelihood
estimation of censored regressions with generated regressors.
We conclude this section with further justifications of our
modeling choices, citing distinctive institutional features of
the dialysis market. First, providers’ choices of capacity are
essentially continuous. Our data show that such capacity
choices for a provider in a market could range from 0 to
almost 60. With such a large action space, it is practically
infeasible to apply a typical multinomial choice framework
to analyze capacity decisions.
Second, a dialysis provider rarely adjusts its capacity after
its initial entry (see Grieco & McDevitt, 2014). This indicates
that providers’ market entry decisions are practically made
simultaneously with their continuous choices of capacity.
Both decisions are de facto permanent, based on providers’
expectation about market profitability.
Finally, providers interact through a simultaneous game
with incomplete information, because each dialysis provider
12 The scale parameter ai could be identified if additional data are available.
For instance, if the average per unit variable profits for each provider are
reported in the data, then they can be used to jointly identify the scale
parameter along with other parameters in the profit functions.
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has little information about components that affect its com-
petitors’ profits (e.g., randomness in their nephrologists’
referral patterns and idiosyncratic elements in their operating
and maintenance costs). Hence a provider’s payoff depends
on idiosyncratic information that is not known to others.
An alternative assumption of complete information would
have ignored such idiosyncrasies in a provider’s private
information set.
IV. Econometric Methods
We now discuss the identification of coefficients βi, γi,j, bi
in equation (3) using a typical two-step argument. First,
under the assumption that private information is independent
across players conditional on market characteristics, player
i’s expectation for competitor j’s capacity in equation (3) is
a function of market characteristics X alone.13 Provided that
data are rationalized by a single profile of PBNE strategies
{K∗i : i ∈ N}, this function is identifiable as the expectation
of K∗j conditional on X. With the scale normalization ai =
1/2, equation (3) becomes
K∗i (X , εi) = max
⎧⎨⎩0, Xβi +∑j =i γi,jϕj(X) − bi − εi
⎫⎬⎭ (4)
for all i, where ϕj(X) ≡ Eεj [K∗j (X, εj)|X] is directly identifi-
able if the data are generated from a single PBNE. With the
distribution of εi parameterized (e.g., as a normal or a logistic
distribution), the joint identification of βi, γi,j, bi and param-
eters in the distribution of εi follows from typical arguments
for parametric tobit models as long as the vector of X and
{ϕj(X)}j =i under equilibrium demonstrates sufficient varia-
tion (i.e., their joint support satisfies a typical mild full-rank
condition).14
This identification strategy leads to the following two-
step estimator. In the first step, estimate the expectation of
providers’ equilibrium capacity choices ϕˆj(X). This could be
done using either kernel estimators (with the local constant
or the polynomial approach) or sieves estimators with poly-
nomial bases. We adopt the latter approach for the estimates
reported in section VI, that is,
ϕˆj(xg) ≡ min{αs}0≤s≤S
1
G
G∑
g=1
[
kg, j −
S∑
s=0
αsx
s
g
]2
, (5)
13 In case the actual data-generating process is such that the firms’ pri-
vate information is positively (or negatively) correlated, our estimates
may understate (or overstate) the negative effects of competitors’ capacity
choices on a provider’s profits.
14 In fact, the identification of coefficients βi, γi, j , bi may be shown for
equation (4) under nonparametric stochastic restrictions on εi instead of
parametric assumptions. Examples of these stochastic restrictions include
independence between εi and X as in Buckley and James (1979) and
Horowitz (1986), conditional symmetry as in Powell (1986), and median
independence in Powell (1984).
where g is an index for the G independent games (markets)
observed in the data and kg, j, xg are realizations of Kj, X in
market g. We set the order S to 4 in estimation. Alternatively,
to reduce computational costs in estimation, one may choose
to replace these first-step nonparametric estimates with those
from a reduced-form Poisson regression. A Poisson regres-
sion works well in practice when the shapes of the empirical
distribution of dependent variables are close to some distribu-
tions from the exponential family. (See Cameron & Trivedi,
1998, and Christensen, 1997, for details.) In such cases, Pois-
son regressions are known to provide good approximations
in terms of model fit, especially when the dependent variables
are continuous or count data, as is the case in our application.
In the second step, use a maximum likelihood estimator
where the distribution of εi is parameterized (e.g., εi˜N(0, σ2i )
for all i, where σ2i is a parameter to be estimated). Specifically,
let θ ≡ (θi)i∈N where θi ≡ (βi, {γi,j}j =i, bi, σi). Our two-stage
estimator is defined as
ˆθTS ≡ arg maxθ 1G log ˆLG(θ)
where
ˆLG(θ) ≡
∏
g≤G
∏
i∈N
ˆfi(kg,i | xg; θi); and (6)
ˆfi(ki | x; θi)
≡
{
1 −Φ
(
xβi +∑j =i γi,jϕˆj(x) − bi
σi
)}1(ki=0)
×
{
1
σi
φ
(
ki − xβi −∑j =i γi,jϕˆj(x) + bi
σi
)}1(ki>0)
.
(7)
With the number of bases used in the first-step polynomial
estimation expanding at an appropriate rate as the sample size
increases, the preliminary estimate ϕˆj(.) converges to the true
function uniformly at a rate fast enough to maintain the root-
n asymptotic normality of the MLE estimators in the second
step.
Alternatively, one could also use another likelihood-based
estimator, denoted ˆθFL, which adopts a full nested fixed-point
maximum-likelihood approach. This estimator amounts to
replacing the first-step estimates ϕˆi in the two-stage estimator
ˆθTS by ϕ˜i(x; θ), which is defined as the solution for {ϕi(x)}i∈N
in the following fixed-point equation: for all i ∈ N ,
ϕi(X) ≡ Eεi [K∗i (X, εi)|X] (8)
= Eεi
⎡⎣max
⎧⎨⎩0 , Xβi +∑j =i γi,jϕj(X) − bi − εi
⎫⎬⎭
∣∣∣∣∣∣X
⎤⎦
.
(9)
970 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Such an estimator is feasible under our specification ofπi and
parameterization of the private information distribution.15
The nested maximum-likelihood estimator used in our case is
analogous to that applied widely to dynamic discrete choice
models (Rust, 1987).
It is possible to improve efficiency in estimation using a
GMM framework that further exploits the fixed-point char-
acterization of ex ante equilibrium capacities in the second
step of the two-stage estimator above. To this end, we pro-
pose a third GMM estimator that incorporates the structural
fixed-point equation (8), which characterizes the expected
capacity for each provider in a PBNE. More specifically, the
GMM estimator is
ˆθGM ≡ arg minθ ˆM ′G(θ) ˆWG ˆMG(θ),
where the empirical moments are
ˆMG(θ) ≡
[
1
G∇θ log ˆLG(θ)
1
G
∑
g≤G
∑
i∈N
[
ϕ˜i(xg; θ) − ϕˆi(xg)
]2
]
. (10)
ˆLG(θ) is defined in equation (6); ˆWG is a consistent estimator
for the optimal GMM weight matrix; ϕˆi(x) is the first-stage
nonparametric estimates for expected capacities in equilib-
rium (e.g., a polynomial approximation defined in equation
[5]); and ϕ˜i(x; θ) is a solution for {ϕi(x)}i∈N in equation (8)
at X = x given the vector of parameters θ. Alternatively,
in order to reduce computational costs, one can also choose
to replace ϕˆi(.) with the fitted values of expected capacities
based on a reduced-form Poisson regression. We adopt this
approach in our estimation later. In section VI, we first obtain
initial GMM estimates by setting the weight matrix to be the
identity matrix. We then estimate the optimal weight matrix
ˆWG using the initial estimates and apply it to weighted GMM
to improve estimation efficiency.
We conclude this section with several remarks regarding
the issue of multiple equilibria and the comparison between
the three estimators ˆθTS, ˆθFL, and ˆθGM .
Remark 1. For any given market characteristics x and any
vector of parameters θ, there could potentially be multi-
ple solutions for {ϕi(x)}i∈N in equation (8). However, such
multiplicity does not affect the validity of our two-stage
estimator under the common assumption that the data are
rationalized by a single Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
This is because under this single equilibrium assumption, a
provider’s expected capacity in the likelihood is directly iden-
tified from the data rather than solved for from equation (8).
15 Under the normality assumption of ε, either (8) has a closed form,
ϕi = Φ
(
xβi +∑j =i γi,jϕj − bi
σi
)
×
⎧⎨⎩xβi +∑j =i γi,jϕj − bi + σi
φ
(
xβi+∑j =i γi,jϕj−bi
σi
)
Φ
(
xβi+∑j =i γi,jϕj−bi
σi
)
⎫⎬⎭ ,
for i ∈ N , where ϕi is the expectation of provider i’s capacity in equilibrium.
On the other hand, the full nested fixed-point MLE esti-
mator is susceptible to the issue of multiple equilibria. To
deal with this, we do not directly apply the original nested
fixed-point MLE, but instead adopt an alternative approach
proposed by Judd and Su (2012). This approach, known
as the mathematical program with equilibrium constraints
(MPEC), reformulates the original problem into the maxi-
mization of likelihood over the space of structural parameters
and strategies subject to a set of constraints that define PBNE.
Hence it avoids the need to solve for the inner loop in the
full nested fixed-point MLE. The MPEC algorithm implic-
itly deals with the multiplicity issue through an effective ad
hoc procedure, which always picks an equilibrium that maxi-
mizes the likelihood. (More detailed discussions are included
in section V.C).
Remark 2. The multiplicity also does not affect the validity
(consistency) of our GMM estimator under the assumption of
a single BNE in the data, as we have incorporated the follow-
ing ad hoc procedure in the calculation of ˆθGM . Suppose for
some (xg, θ) the system of equations in equation (8) admits
multiple solutions of the vector ϕ˜(xg; θ) ≡ {ϕ˜i(xg; θ)}i∈N
(which are often picked up by experimenting with multiple
initial points while solving the nonlinear fixed-point equa-
tion in that equation). In such cases, choose the vector of
ϕ˜(xg; θ) that minimizes the empirical moments in equation
(10) while evaluating the objective function of GMM. To see
how such a procedure maintains the consistency of ˆθGM under
multiple equilibria, note that the second set of moments in
section (10) takes a form similar to the objective function of
a minimum-distance estimator. Thus, this procedure is effec-
tively using the directly identifiable E[K∗i (X, εi)|X] to guide
our choices of equilibrium-implied expected capacity while
implementing GMM.
Remark 3. The two-stage estimator ˆθTS and the full nested
fixed-point ML estimator ˆθFL have respective advantages. As
explained in remark 1, ˆθTS is robust to the issue of multi-
ple equilibria but does not explicitly use the structure in the
fixed-point characterization of ex ante capacities in equilib-
rium (i.e., the ϕi’s). In contrast, ˆθFL is explicit in exploiting
this structural relation defining {ϕi}i∈N , but is potentially
susceptible to the issue of multiple equilibria.16 Therefore,
choices between the two should depend on researchers’
judgment about the possibility of multiple equilibria in the
data-generating process. The GMM estimator ˆθGM provides
the benefits of both estimators. Due to the use of the second
set of moments, it not only exploits the structural relations
defining ex ante capacity but also manages to deal with the
issue of equilibrium multiplicity under the assumption that
choices of capacity in the data are rationalized by a single
pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
16 The full-maximum-likelihood estimator should be more efficient than
the two-step estimator, provided the identification of parameters holds under
the parameterization, and the model always admits a unique PBNE under
all x and θ.
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V. Data Description
A. Construction of the Sample and the Definition of Markets
We construct our sample from the Dialysis Facility Com-
pare Data published by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) in 2007. The CMS receives monthly updates
about the characteristics of each facility (e.g., name, address,
chain affiliation, number of dialysis stations, date of certifi-
cation) and posts them online every quarter. Several recent
studies on the dialysis market have used a similar data set
(e.g., Ramanarayanan & Snyder, 2011; Grieco & McDevitt,
2014; Cutler et al., 2012). The key variable of interest is
a provider’s choice of capacity, or the number of dialysis
stations.
The market for outpatient dialysis is local in nature. Dialy-
sis patients usually receive three treatment sessions per week,
each of which lasts for about four hours. They are in gen-
eral unwilling (or unable) to travel too far. According to
the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), the
median driving distance between patients and dialysis facility
is 6 miles. Following several other studies on dialysis mar-
kets (Grieco & McDevitt, 2014; Cutler et al., 2012), we use
Hospital Service Area (HSA) to delineate the local market.
HSA is compiled by the Dartmouth Atlas (Dartmouth Med-
ical School, 2006) from Medicare data on patients’ choices
of hospitals. Such an area is relatively self-contained with
respect to health care services.17 The number of HSAs in
the United States is roughly equal to the number of U.S.
counties; however, their boundaries do not overlap in gen-
eral. Unfortunately, demographics such as population, age,
and racial composition are not available at the HSA level. To
obtain the market-level profit and the cost shifters, we assign
each HSA to a county based on the population distribution
within the HSA.18 Then we use county-level demograph-
ics data from the U.S. Census (e.g., racial composition, age,
income, poverty, size of business payroll) to approximate the
population characteristics within an HSA.
We supplement the demographics data from the Census
with hospital and physician capacity data from the Dart-
mouth Atlas (Dartmouth Medical School, 2006). While the
Dartmouth Atlas reports this information only for 2006, it
provides a good approximation for 2007 because there were
no major shifts in the industry environment between these
two consecutive years. We use the age-adjusted prevalence
rate of diabetes as a proxy for ESRD risks. We also use hos-
pital beds and the number of nephrologists to control for the
base demand and the intensity of health care. We include
these variables because market population alone does not
17 Specifically, an HSA is defined by assigning postal codes to the hospital
area where the greatest proportion of their Medicare residents (including
those with ESRD) were hospitalized. In the absence of detailed patient-
level information, HSA approximates geographic markets for dialysis more
closely than alternative definitions (e.g., county, state, or metropolitan
statistical area).
18 We decompose each HSA into a collection of postal codes and obtain
the population for each code from the Census. We assign HSA to a county
if that county contains the largest proportion of HSA population.
accurately reflect the size of the customer base relevant to
the dialysis service industry. By including the diabetic preva-
lence rates and other factors related to ERSD risks, we expect
to obtain a better measure of the size of the customer base
for dialysis treatment in each market. Hence our treatment of
the market size differs slightly from the classical approach
in entry games such as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), but
is comparable to those in Jia (2008) and Ciliberto and Tamer
(2009). Moreover, our estimation results that follow show
these additional variables explain a significant portion of the
variation in the capacity choice of dialysis providers.
Following Ford and Kaserman (1993), who showed the
certificate of need (CON) regulation, discouraged entry by
requiring additional regulatory procedure for providers to
establish their market presence, we construct a binary indi-
cator for the state-level CON regulation. Finally, we use the
distance between an HSA and the headquarters of the chains
as cost shifters.19
The distribution of dialysis capacity is highly skewed. For
example, in a sample that includes almost all HSAs in the
lower 48 states, the average market capacity in a given mar-
ket is about 21, but the total dialysis capacity in some markets
can be as high as 1,309. The high-capacity outliers usu-
ally lie in heavily populated cities such as Chicago and Los
Angeles. In these markets, chain providers often operate mul-
tiple branches in close proximity to each other. The nature of
competitive interactions is clearly different from an average
market. For our analysis, we chose to focus on areas with pop-
ulation between 40,000 and 800,000.20 We exclude another
124 outliers with total market capacity greater than 60.21 As a
robustness check, we perform the analysis in larger samples
that include almost all HSAs using the two-stage estimator.
We obtain results very similar to what we report in the paper.
These additional results are reported in panel A of table A1
in the appendix. Our main results are also robust to alterna-
tive sample selection criteria as shown in panels B and C in
table A1.22
19 We use the HSA boundary file from Dartmouth Atlas (Dartmouth Med-
ical School, 2006) to pinpoint the centroid for the market. The distance from
the geographical center of each HSA to the headquarters of either chain is
calculated using the Haversine formula.
20 This eliminates 1,646 HSAs, most of them sparsely populated rural
areas and quite different from an average market. According to MedPAC,
the median distance between a rural patient and a dialysis station is almost
four times longer than for urban patients. Therefore, patients in rural areas
are more likely to seek outside options such as hospital units or home
dialysis service. Nevertheless, we test the robustness of our results in panel
A of table A1 using an alternative sample selection criterion based on an
enlarged sample with more than 3,000 HSAs and get results very similar
to our main specification. Besides, our sample selection criterion is in line
with other studies (e.g., Bresnahan & Reiss, 1991; Collard-Wexler, 2013).
21 Our current cutoff is approximately the 90th percentile in the distribu-
tion of total capacity in a market. Our results are robust to alternative cutoff
values (e.g., the 95th or the 85th percentile in capacity distribution). See
panels B and C in table A1 for details.
22 There is no obvious evidence that the actual geographic market should
be more disaggregated than HSA. If the actual market is more disaggregated
than HSA, we would obtain very different results when large markets are
excluded from the estimation sample. In an additional robustness check, we
perform our analysis using the two-stage estimator after excluding market
in areas with more than 200,000 residents. The estimates obtained using
the smaller sample are similar to our main specification.
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Table 1.—Summary Statistics of Capacity Distribution
Variable Definition Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Kfmc FMC’s capacity decision 6.40 11.4 0 60
Kdav DaVita’s capacity decision 4.40 9.22 0 54
Knonchain Nonchain’s capacity decision 5.32 10.0 0 58
Ifmc I(Kfmc > 0) 0.31 0.46 0 1
Idav I(Kdav > 0) 0.23 0.42 0 1
Inonchain I(Knonchain > 0) 0.28 0.45 0 1
Kfmc | Ifmc = 1 FMC’s capacity conditional on entry 20.4 11.2 2 60
Kdav | Idav = 1 DaVita’s capacity conditional on entry 19.3 9.24 7 54
Knonchain | Inonchain = 1 Nonchain’s capacity conditional on entry 18.9 10.0 1 58
Number of observations: 1,320.
Our final sample contains 1,320 HSA and 1,287 facilities
in the 48 contiguous states in 2007. Conditional on entry into
these markets, chain dialysis providers usually open a sin-
gle branch. One potential concern is that capacity decisions
of chain providers are correlated across markets. However,
such a concern is minimal for our analysis since our sample
selection criterion ensures the markets are relatively isolated.
A back-of-the-envelope spatial analysis shows that the aver-
age distance from an FMC facility in the sample to its closest
FMC neighbor is 12.5 miles; the same statistic for DaVita
is 12.3 miles.23 Most of the facilities (287 out of 353 for
DaVita and 242 out of 490 for FMC) are not within 10 miles
of another facility of the same chain. Overall, there is no evi-
dence that correlation between capacity decisions should be
a concern for our analysis.
B. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the capacity choices of FMC, DaVita,
and nonchain providers. There are two significant empirical
regularities. First, dialysis providers’ capacity choices vary
substantially over a wide support. For example, the average
capacity of FMC is 6.4, followed by nonchain and DaVita.
The standard deviations for these providers range between
9.22 and 11.4. While one may estimate a multinomial choice
model by grouping capacity levels into aggregate categories
(such as low, medium, and high capacity), this type of exercise
would overlook the information contained in the rich varia-
tion in the choices of capacity. Furthermore, in our sample,
the number of dialysis stations in a given facility ranges from
1 to 54. Thus, even after removing the outliers, the action
space remains too large for a multinomial choice model.
Therefore, we analyze dialysis providers’ capacity decisions
as continuous choices. Second, there is a substantial num-
ber of markets in which some providers choose not to enter.
FMC, the largest provider, enters about 31% of the markets
(followed by nonchain, 28%, and DaVita, 23%). Thus, the
overall unconditional expectation of capacity is much smaller
than the mean capacity conditional on entry.
The correlation between entry and capacity decisions in
table 2 presents descriptive evidence for strategic interac-
tions. A provider’s market presence and capacity choice are
23 The calculation of distances is based on both in-sample and out-of-
sample facilities.
Table 2.—Capacity Correlations
Correlation
Ifmc Idav Inonchain Kfmc Kdav Knonchain
Ifmc 1
Idav −0.12 1
Inonchain −0.13 −0.07 1
Kfmc 0.83 −0.12 −0.12 1
Kdav −0.14 0.88 −0.04 −0.13 1
Knonchain −0.13 −0.09 0.85 −0.13 −0.06 1
Number of observations: 1,320.
both negatively correlated with its competitors’. For example,
the correlation between FMC and DaVita’s entry decisions is
–0.12, while the correlation between DaVita’s capacity and
FMC’s entry decision is –0.14. This suggests DaVita and
FMC generally enter different markets, and DaVita is even
less likely to enter when FMC chooses a larger capacity.
However, we cannot infer from these aggregate correlation
patterns alone that all providers’ response curves to com-
petitors’ choices of capacity are downward sloping, for this
would risk overlooking the heterogeneity in providers’ profit
and cost structures. The observed aggregate correlation pat-
tern in table 2 could be mostly driven by a subset of providers
or a subset of markets in data and thus may not be represen-
tative of the other providers or markets in general. Indeed, a
key motivation for our structural analyses in section IV is the
need to account for such heterogeneity in the reaction curve
across providers.
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the market demo-
graphics. An average market in our sample is populated by
75,531 residents, 1,030 miles away from FMC’s headquar-
ter and 1,100 miles away from Davita’s headquarter. About
23% of the markets are located in the Northeast region, 24%
in the Midwest, 17% in the West, and the remaining 31%
in the South. The CON regulation is effective in 21% of
the markets. We employ a parsimonious set of profit and
cost shifters, including the percent of population over age
65 and racial composition. In alternative specifications, we
experiment with a larger set of variables such as poverty
rate, income, population density, size of business payroll,
number of uninsured, number of hospital registered nurses,
and size and racial mixes of Medicare enrollees. These vari-
ables do little to explain the variation in dialysis capacity, and
therefore we did not include them in our main specification.
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Table 3.—Summary Statistics of Market Variables
Variable Definition Mean SD
pop* Total HSA population from DA 75,531 65,734
black Percent black from Census 0.07 0.09
white Percent white from Census 0.88 0.11
latino Percent Latino from Census 0.09 0.11
asian Percent Asia from Census 0.02 0.03
age1 Percent population age between 22 and
44 from Census
0.33 0.04
age2 Percent population age between 44 and
65 from Census
0.34 0.04
age3 Percent population age 65+ from Census 0.14 0.03
neph Number of nephrologists per 1,000
population from DA
1.51 1.00
bed* Number of hospital bed per 1,000
population from DA
2.59 0.89
rn Number of registered nurse per 1,000
population from DA
1.32 0.27
dbrate Prevalence rate of diabetes 8.42 1.63
conreg CON regulation indicator 0.21 0.41
NE Northeast region indicator 0.23 0.42
MW Midwest region indicator 0.24 0.42
West West region indicator 0.17 0.37
dfmc Distance to FMC’s headquarter in 1,000
miles
1.03 0.73
dfmc2 dfmc squared 1.60 2.04
ddav Distance to DaVita’s headquarter in
1,000 miles
1.10 0.38
ddav2 ddave squared 1.34 0.83
Number of observations: 1,320. Variables labeled with an asterisk enter the estimation in logs and are
reported without logging in this table. Explanatory variables come from the Dartmouth Atlas (Dartmouth
Medical School, 2006) Census Bureau when indicated and otherwise are constructed by the authors.
C. Details in Implementing the Estimators
We estimate the model using the estimators described in
section IV. Table 4 presents the results. Panels A, B, and C
present the results from the two-stage estimator ˆθTS, the max-
imum likelihood (nested fixed-point) estimator ˆθFL, and the
GMM estimator ˆθGM , respectively. We now provide further
details in the implementation of these estimators.
In the first step of the two-stage estimation, we adopt
the Poisson regression approach to estimate each provider’s
expected capacity in equilibrium. That is, we fit the observed
capacity choices to a Poisson distribution and use it to esti-
mate a provider’s expected capacity. A Poisson regression is
convenient because the observed capacity choices are non-
negative, with many observations censored at 0. In a finite
sample with a moderate size such as ours, a Poisson distri-
bution fits the data better than the nonparametric alternative
of polynomial approximation.24 In the second step, we use
a tobit model to estimate the effect of Ê(K∗−i|X) and X on
Ki, where Ê(K∗−i|X) is the predicted capacity obtained from
the first step. We follow a standard bootstrap procedure to
calculate the standard errors of the estimates, based on 300
bootstrap samples.
We estimate ˆθFL by reformulating the nested fixed-point
MLE as the MPEC optimization strategy introduced by
Judd and Su (2012). The standard maximization routines for
24 The R2 in Poisson regression are 31%, 30%, and 23% for FMC, DaVita,
and nonchain; they are 22%, 22%, and 18% in polynomial approximation.
Table 4.—Strategic Capacity Model
FMC Dav Nonchain
EST SE EST SE EST SE
A. Two-Stage Estimation
(
ˆθTS
)a
Kfmc −1.06 0.24∗∗∗ −0.73 0.24∗∗∗
Kdav −1.07 0.26∗∗∗ −0.68 0.26∗∗∗
Knonchain −1.43 0.26∗∗∗ −1.04 0.30∗∗∗
lpop 25.0 2.20∗∗∗ 24.9 2.43∗∗∗ 21.7 2.10∗∗∗
neph 2.46 0.76∗∗∗ 3.38 0.99∗∗∗ 1.23 0.87
lbed 1.39 4.19 −5.34 4.51 4.04 4.65
rn 9.87 −4.45∗∗ 11.3 4.84∗∗ 3.44 5.04
dbrate 2.21 0.76∗∗∗ 1.35 0.93 0.44 0.84
conreg −4.84 1.92∗∗ −2.66 1.99 −3.54 2.11∗
NE −8.16 4.04∗∗ −10.0 5.07∗∗ 7.68 4.99
MW −8.80 2.54∗∗∗ −4.71 3.26 −5.35 2.96∗
West −8.49 4.00∗∗ −10.8 5.18∗∗ 10.5 4.10∗∗
dfmc 10.9 9.18 30.7 10.7∗∗∗ 33.8 11.7∗∗∗
dfmc2 −3.96 3.03 −8.22 3.69∗∗ −12.3 3.65∗∗∗
ddav 12.6 14.2 7.70 16.9 72.9 13.6∗∗∗
ddav2 −6.27 7.12 2.99 8.38 −33.3 6.85∗∗∗
black 60.2 22.6∗∗∗ 22.5 22.5 81.0 44.2∗
white 22.8 20.7 −14.1 20.3 69.2 43.3
latino 38.1 8.56∗∗∗ 7.69 10.3 16.1 10.2
asian −86.6 50.1∗ 21.5 47.5 87.9 56.4
age1 29.0 45.9 −98.2 52.7∗ −12.0 47.8
age2 81.9 39.7∗∗ −40.7 46.8 7.13 42.9
age3 53.4 37.0 −45.7 43.9 28.2 41.3
cons −384 45.6∗∗∗ −270 55.0∗∗∗ −382 61.0∗∗∗
sigma 23.0 0.71∗∗∗ 24.1 0.86∗∗∗ 22.9 0.74∗∗∗
B. Fixed Point ML
(
ˆθFL
)b
Kfmc −1.88 0.19∗∗∗
Kdav −2.32 0.25∗∗∗ −1.86 0.22∗∗∗
Knonchain −1.44 0.20∗∗∗ −1.73 0.26∗∗∗ −1.58 0.23∗∗∗
lpop 25.0 1.59∗∗∗ 28.3 2.23∗∗∗ 26.9 2.11∗∗∗
neph 2.11 0.76∗∗∗ 2.34 0.89∗∗∗ 2.11 0.93∗∗
lbed −0.37 4.00 −0.55 4.80 −0.04 4.63
rn 10.8 4.33∗∗∗ 12.1 5.12∗∗∗ 10.7 4.95∗∗
dbrate 1.47 0.76∗∗ 1.47 0.92∗ 0.91 0.91
conreg −3.93 1.90∗∗ −3.91 2.25∗∗ −4.08 2.16∗∗
NE −6.17 −4.03∗ −5.38 4.92 −0.66 4.70
MW −7.35 2.61∗∗∗ −8.09 3.18∗∗∗ −7.65 3.09∗∗∗
West 4.78 4.35 8.54 5.55∗ 12.7 4.64∗∗∗
dfmc 22.7 10.1∗∗ 30.4 12.1∗∗∗ 37.8 11.4∗∗∗
dfmc2 −8.91 3.30∗∗∗ −11.6 3.98∗∗∗ −14.4 3.60∗∗∗
ddav 2.51 13.3 10.7 16.0 32.6 15.8∗∗
ddav2 −0.73 6.37 −3.74 7.69 −13.6 7.47∗∗
black 41.8 19.4∗∗ 43.2 20.4∗∗ 65.9 32.2∗∗
white 15.6 18.3 15.8 18.4 42.4 30.9∗
latino 14.7 8.65∗∗ 13.5 11.2 12.6 10.1
asian 25.3 42.3 40.7 43.8 64.8 49.2∗
age1 −7.01 46.3 −18.4 53.3 −9.17 50.4
age2 −3.77 40.3 −16.7 45.7 −18.8 44.0
age3 90.4 39.7∗∗ 90.7 47.9∗∗ 86.2 44.9∗∗
cons −330 39.6∗∗∗ −375 51.4∗∗∗ −395 51.9∗∗∗
sigma 20.4 0.80∗∗∗ 22.3 1.15∗∗∗ 22.5 1.03∗∗∗
C: GMM
(
ˆθGM
)c
Kfmc −2.17 0.09∗∗∗ −0.82 0.10∗∗∗
Kdav −0.76 0.10∗∗∗ −0.61 0.08∗∗∗
Knonchain −0.86 0.17∗∗∗ −1.45 0.16∗∗∗
lpop 20.1 1.22∗∗∗ 35.1 1.19∗∗∗ 20.9 0.78∗∗∗
neph 2.00 0.11∗∗∗ 4.36 0.11∗∗∗ 2.00 0.05∗∗∗
lbed 3.86 0.97∗∗∗ 4.74 0.80∗∗∗ 1.06 0.89
rn 6.39 2.08∗∗∗ 9.59 1.80∗∗∗ 5.35 0.78∗∗∗
dbrate 2.03 0.68∗∗∗ 2.43 0.55∗∗∗ 0.51 0.67
conreg −4.08 0.42∗∗∗ −5.10 0.38∗∗∗ −2.60 0.15∗∗∗
NE −9.45 3.13∗∗∗ −16.5 2.88∗∗∗ 5.70 0.98∗∗∗
MW −6.74 0.98∗∗∗ −8.54 0.87∗∗∗ −6.56 0.36∗∗∗
West −7.24 0.88∗∗∗ −13.4 0.78∗∗∗ 9.10 1.23∗∗∗
dfmc −1.41 6.10 7.91 5.66∗ 28.3 2.93∗∗∗
dfmc2 −0.02 1.75 −1.17 1.60 −10.7 0.89∗∗∗
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Table 4.—(Continued)
FMC Dav Nonchain
EST SE EST SE EST SE
C: GMM
(
ˆθGM
)c
ddav −4.25 8.39 5.98 6.73 63.2 10.6∗∗∗
ddav2 0.00 4.69 −0.62 3.71 −30.3 3.89∗∗∗
black 70.7 14.9∗∗∗ 75.6 9.88∗∗∗ 82.9 88.2
white 28.8 18.8∗ 12.7 12.6 69.1 88.9
latino 27.6 16.8∗ 22.7 13.1∗∗ 16.1 10.3∗
asian −30.8 72.1 −11.2 48.9 65.2 110
age1 12.9 175 −78.8 138 20.0 112
age2 41.0 131 −29.1 103 35.0 86.6
age3 44.5 112 10.9 88.6 39.4 74.9
cons −298 129∗∗ −416 106∗∗∗ −384 146∗∗∗
sigma 21.3 0.19∗∗∗ 25.1 0.04∗∗∗ 22.7 0.07∗∗∗
***p < 1%, **p < 5%, *p < 10%. Number of observation: 1,320.
aThe estimates are obtained using two-stage estimator. Kfmc ,Kdav ,Knonchain are the expected capacity
choice of FMC, DaVita, and nonchain, respectively. The expected capacity choices of each provider are
estimated in the first step using a Poisson regression, with regressors being the polynomials of market
characteristics. The standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap procedure. lpop and lbed are logged
population and logged number of hospital beds. The definitions of other variables are presented in table 3.
bThe estimates are obtained using maximum likelihood. Kfmc ,Kdav ,Knonchain are the expected capacity
choice of FMC, DaVita, and nonchain, respectively. The nested fixed point problem is recast as MPEC
and estimated using Knitro. lpop and lbed are logged population and logged number of hospital beds. The
definitions of other variables are presented in table 3.
cThe estimates are obtained through GMM. Kfmc ,Kdav ,Knonchain are the expected capacity choices of
FMC, DaVita, and nonchain, respectively. lpop and lbed are logged population and logged number of
hospital beds. The definitions of other variables are presented in table 3.
calculating the nested fixed-point MLE is computationally
demanding, because it requires solving for equilibrium out-
comes defined by the fixed-point mapping (8) in every market
for every iteration of parameter values throughout the maxi-
mization routine. Besides, the issue of multiplicity arises in
such routines because a given parameter may well admit more
than one Bayesian Nash equilibria in general.
In comparison, the MPEC algorithm maximizes the like-
lihood with respect to both model parameters and providers’
strategies (as characterized by each provider’s expected
capacity) in each market subject to the constraints that the
expected capacity choices constitute an equilibrium in the
model. As Judd and Su (2012) showed, the solution to the con-
strained maximum likelihood is equivalent to the solution of
the nested fixed point. MPEC differs from nested fixed-point
MLE computationally in that the constrained maximization in
MPEC does not require solving for the nonlinear fixed-point
equation in every market. For our application, there are 1,320
markets with three choice variables in each market. The like-
lihood is maximized with respect to 3,960 more parameters
(in addition to the covariates of our empirical specification)
subject to 3,960 constraints defined by equation (8). Besides,
MPEC is also known to have dealt with the issue of multiple
equilibria implicitly; that is, evaluating the likelihood at an
MPEC solution is equivalent to evaluating the likelihood at a
nested fixed-point MLE solution when the equilibrium selec-
tion mechanism is degenerate at an equilibrium that yields
the highest likelihood. (For more details, see proposition 1 in
Judd & Su, 2012, and the subsequent discussions.) The stan-
dard errors are obtained through the Hessian of the likelihood
function evaluated at our estimates.
To implement our GMM estimator, we use two sets of
moment conditions as defined in equation (10). The first set
consists of the first-order condition for maximizing the like-
lihood defined in equation (6). The second set of moments
matches the expected capacity predicted in equilibrium to
that directly recovered from data. To reduce computational
costs, we use fitted values from a Poisson regression as the
first-step estimates ϕˆi and use the MPEC algorithm to find
the maximizer of the GMM objective function. We follow
a standard sequential approach for estimation using GMM:
first obtain an initial GMM estimate by setting the weight
matrix to be the identity matrix and then use it to compute
the optimal weight matrix. We then reestimate the model by
substituting the optimal weight matrix into the GMM objec-
tive function. The standard errors for the GMM estimator ˆθGM
are then calculated using the classical approach as in section
6 of Newey and McFadden (1994).25
VI. Results
A. Estimates
The estimates from each panel of table 4 are close in
magnitude. The standard errors for GMM estimators are
often smaller than those for the two-step estimators (e.g.,
population, nephrologist, diabetes rate, register nurse, CON
regulation), especially the standard errors on coefficients of
strategic variables. This seems to suggest gains in estima-
tion efficiency from exploiting the equilibrium structure of
our model. Since GMM is advantageous over two-stage and
fixed-point maximum likelihood, we focus our discussion
based on GMM estimates (unless otherwise indicated).
The strategic effect of rival’s capacity is strongly signifi-
cant with a negative sign. This result is robust to the estimators
used. The magnitudes of the strategic coefficients suggest
that FMC competes aggressively with all other providers.
For example, according to the GMM estimates, the effect
of FMC on DaVita is about 50% larger than the effect of
nonchain (–2.17 versus –1.45) while it is 30% larger than
the effect of DaVita on nonchain (–0.82 versus –0.61). Nev-
ertheless, there is no significant evidence that competition is
more intense between the two chain providers. The difference
in the strategic effects may be ascribed to the heterogeneity
in providers and market conditions. For example, different
providers often have access to different networks of nephrol-
ogists that they can expect to get referrals from. Discrepancies
in business strategies or management styles across providers
may also explain part of the heterogeneity.
The strategic effects are quite large. A quick calculation
of the marginal effects (similar to those calculated for a tobit
model) suggests that, holding other factors in the profits fixed
at their mean value, a 1 unit increase in DaVita’s expected
capacity in equilibrium decreases FMC’s capacity by 0.24
25 This classical approach essentially amounts to stacking all moments
used for estimation together (i.e., including those used for estimating
the linear coefficients in the Poisson regressions in the first step) and
then estimating the covariance matrix based on such an augmented set of
moments.
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units and a 1 unit increase in nonchain’s expected capacity
decreases FMC’s capacity by 0.27 unit. For both DaVita and
nonchain, FMC poses a stronger competitive pressure. A 1
unit increase in FMC’s expected capacity reduces DaVita’s
capacity by 0.37 units and nonchain’s capacity by 0.21 units.
The strategic interactions between dialysis providers also
imply a strong effect of capacity choices on competitors’
entry probabilities. Our estimates imply that FMC poses the
strongest competition to both DaVita and nonchain. A 1 unit
increase in FMC’s capacity decreases the entry probability of
DaVita and nonchain by 0.03 and 0.01, respectively, in a mar-
ket with average characteristics, which translates into 12.5
and 3.3 percentage point decreases.26 Since each provider
generally chooses different levels of capacity, a rival’s pres-
ence should have a nonuniform effect across markets, and the
competition should be more intense when the rival chooses a
higher capacity level. A model that focuses on discrete market
entry decisions would have overlooked these heterogeneous
competitive interactions.
The negative impact of competitors’ capacities on a
provider’s profits may come from several distinct chan-
nels. First, additional competitors affect a provider’s profits
by splitting the existing customers from that provider. By
diverting patients away from incumbents, the presence of an
additional competitor may lower the utilization of the facili-
ties, increase the variable cost per unit in capacity, and lead
to a lower margin per unit in capacity. Second, competition
can also lead to a lower price for privately insured patients
(Cutler et al., 2012), and therefore lowers the average per
patient margin. Third, providers also compete for a limited
supply of trained personnel (e.g., nurses and technicians) who
operate dialysis stations to generate revenues. Fourth, for
each provider, competitors with a higher capacity are likely
to offer more flexible schedules, holding other things fixed
(e.g., utilization rates), and thus have greater negative impact
in terms of splitting customers. With more detailed patient-
and facility-level data, it is possible to conduct a full structural
analysis of patients’ choices on the demand side, and thus dis-
tinguish the impacts of competitors’ capacity through these
distinct channels.
Most of the coefficients in table 4 are significant, with
expected signs. Market size, extent of the diabetic population,
and supply of local nephrologists and registered nurses are
positively associated with the capacity of all providers, while
entry barriers such as CON regulation are negatively asso-
ciated with capacity choices. Some market conditions may
be important for one firm but not for others. This implies
that dialysis firms target different demographics, and it is
important to account for firm heterogeneity. Distance to head-
quarters does not seem to be very important to the capacity
26 The percentage points are computed based on the mean entry probability
of 0.24 and 0.30 for DaVita and nonchain, respectively. The 0.03 points
decrease in probability is equivalent to 0.03/0.24 = 12.5% in percentage
points.
Table 5.—Equilibrium Response to Market Variables
Capacity Number of HEP Markets
FMC DaVita Nonchain FMC DaVita Nonchain
base case 8,003 5,586 6,700 330 115 214
Population
increases 10%
8,560 6,097 7,238 368 137 246
Nephrologists
increase 10%
8,066 5,784 6,766 337 126 216
Prevalence rate of
diabetes
increases 10%
8,996 5,593 6,565 395 107 202
CON regulation = 0
for all markets
8,336 5,593 6,795 354 114 216
Number of observations: 1,320. Capacity is derived from equation (8) after adjusting market variables.
The “Capacity” column reports the sum of expected capacity choice for each provider across markets. The
number of HEP (high-entry probability) markets for a provider is defined as the number of markets in
which that provider’s entry probability is estimated to be greater than 0.5. It is reported in the “Number of
HEP Markets” column.
choice of the two leading chain providers.27 But nonchain
providers are more likely to offer positive capacity when the
market is farther away from either chain’s headquarters.
To better understand the magnitude of these estimates,
table 5 reports the equilibrium response in capacity and the
number of markets with high entry probabilities (i.e., greater
than 50%) based on the GMM estimates when some market-
level variables (i.e., population, the number of nephrologists,
and the diabetes prevalence rate) change.28 To derive the
effect on capacity, we resolve the equilibrium based on equa-
tion (8) after adjusting these market-level variables upward
by 10%. The equilibrium entry probability of a provider on
a market characterized by x is computed as
Pr(K∗i > 0|x) = Φ[(xβi +
∑
j =i
γi,jE[K∗j |x] − bi)/σi],
(11)
and E(K∗|X) is the new equilibrium capacity after the adjust-
ment of market variables. We also calculate a measure of
provider-specific market penetration under these hypotheti-
cal adjustments. Such a measure is defined as the proportion
of markets in the sample where a provider would enter
with probability greater than 50% under the adjustment
considered.
The effect of population is quite substantial. When the pop-
ulation increases by 10%, the total capacity unambiguously
increases by 7%, 9%, and 8% for FMC, DaVita, and nonchain,
while the market penetration (as measured by the num-
ber of markets with high entry probabilities for a provider)
increases by 12%, 19%, and 15%, respectively. There are mild
increases in capacity and market penetration measures when
the number of nephrologists increases by 10%. The effect on
nonchain providers is the smallest. This is probably not too
27 Distance to FMC’s headquarter is marginally significant for DaVita. All
other distance variables are insignificant for the two chain providers.
28 The two-stage and maximum likelihood estimates generate very similar
outcomes.
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surprising since many nonchain dialysis facilities are owned
and operated by local nephrologist groups. By contrast, chain
facilities benefit more from a larger nephrologist stock since
such stocks make it easier to locate medical directors with an
established referral base. The increase in the prevalence rate
of diabetes has heterogeneous effects on different providers.
While FMC increases the capacity substantially, nonchain
providers reduce the capacity, while the capacity of DaVita
remains almost constant. This seems to suggest that FMC
exerts an intense competitive pressure on its competitors. In
general, a larger diabetic patient base in a market increases
the profitability of the dialysis business as a whole. How-
ever, for DaVita or nonchain providers, this positive effect
on profits is neutralized or reversed by an offsetting compe-
tition effect due to the expansion of FMC in the new market
equilibrium. Such a competition effect is evident from our
estimates for the negative strategic effects of capacity, which
imply downward-sloping reaction curves for all providers.
A similar intuition could explain why both DaVita and non-
chain respond mildly to the repeal of CON regulation by
increasing its capacity, while FMC increases its capacity
substantially.
As robustness checks, we estimate the model using a
larger sample with 3,129 markets (HSAs) with no popula-
tion restrictions and the two-stage estimator. We report the
results in panel A of table A1 in the appendix. This includes
92% of all HSAs in the continental United States. In addition,
we experimented with alternative sample selection criteria
by focusing on markets with total capacity below 80 or
40 (instead of 60 as in panel A). The results in panels B
and C of table A1 remain qualitatively similar to those in
table 4.
It is worth noting that the results from panel A in table A1
also help to justify indirectly the assumption that providers’
private information is independent. To see this, suppose
providers’ private information is correlated with some market
conditions that are not reported in the data but are commonly
known to all providers (e.g., a limited supply of experienced
nurses or managers). If such omitted conditions vary across
markets and are known to be correlated with other market
characteristics reported in data, then we should expect to
obtain very different estimates of coefficients in the profit
function using samples that differ in these reported market
characteristics. In our context, it is plausible that unobserved
conditions (such as the limited supply of qualified facility
managers and staffs) are correlated with the population den-
sity of the markets. Table A1 (panel A) reports estimates
of strategic coefficients using the two-stage estimator in an
enlarged sample with 3,129 markets, which include those
with substantially different population densities. These esti-
mates are very similar to those based on a smaller sample in
table 4 (panel A). This offers some evidence that the indepen-
dent private information assumption works reasonably well
in our setting.
Table 6.—Model Fit
Capacity Entry Probability
FMC DaVita Nonchain FMC DaVita Nonchain
Observed
Mean 6.40 4.40 5.32 0.31 0.23 0.28
SD 11.4 9.23 10.0 0.46 0.42 0.45
Two-stage
Mean 6.24 4.15 5.13 0.34 0.24 0.30
SD 5.56 4.18 4.62 0.22 0.18 0.19
Maximum likelihood
Mean 6.23 4.16 4.81 0.34 0.24 0.27
SD 7.68 5.82 5.56 0.22 0.18 0.20
GMM
Mean 6.06 4.23 5.08 0.35 0.24 0.30
SD 5.33 4.46 4.16 0.21 0.18 0.18
Number of observations: 1,320. Mean reports the sample average. SD reports the standard deviation.
The Observed panel reports the statistics from data, and the Two-Stage, ML, and GM panels report the
model prediction from three estimators, respectively.
B. Model Fit
We compute the fitted (implied) values of capacity choices
and entry probabilities using three sets of estimates ˆθTS, ˆθFL,
and ˆθGM , respectively, and compare them with observed out-
comes in the data. Overall, the three estimators produce very
similar results. Such a similarity is not surprising ex post,
because these estimators essentially use the same set of infor-
mation.29 These predictions also suggest that our model fits
the data quite well.
First, we compute the expected capacity choice E(K∗|X)
implied by model estimates. These expectations are solutions
to fixed-point equation (8) based on the parameter estimates.
We find the predicted expected capacity from all three esti-
mators is close to the average capacity in data. For example,
the average capacities in data are 6.40, 4.40, and 5.32 for
each provider, while our GMM estimates predict 6.06, 4.23,
and 5.08 respectively. Results obtained from the two-stage
and maximum likelihood estimates are similar. This suggests
that our model estimates explain capacity choices quite well
on average.
Second, we compute the implied entry probabilities for
each provider and compare them with entry probabilities
observed in data. The predicted entry probabilities are cal-
culated using equation (11) where E[K∗i |x] solves the fixed-
point equation in equation (8). The rows in table 6 report
the means and the standard deviations of such probabilities
for each provider. The predicted entry probabilities are close
to the entry proportions reported in data. For example, the
empirical entry probability for DaVita is 0.23 in data, while
our model predicts an average entry probability of 0.24. We
also impute binary entry decisions based on whether the
29 Even in the ML estimator, the MPEC algorithm implicitly uses data to
guide through multiple equilibria by always picking the vector of parameters
and strategies that maximizes the likelihood. GMM estimator is compu-
tationally different from ML since one set of moments consists of the
first-order conditions (in analytical form) for maximizing the likelihood.
Depending on the shape of the likelihood function around the true value
of parameters, GMM estimates may be less susceptible to “optimization
errors” in the minimization routine.
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implied entry probability of a market is greater than 50%.
Based on such imputations and GMM estimates, we find
our model correctly predicts the binary entry decisions in
70%, 78%, and 73% of the markets for FMC, DaVita, and
nonchain, respectively. Similarly, the proportions of correct
predictions are 70%, 78%, and 65% based on the two-stage
estimates and 65%, 77% and 74% based on the maximum
likelihood estimates. Overall, our model does well in dealing
with the censoring in capacity data.
Finally, we extrapolate from our sample and use our esti-
mates to predict the capacity choices in 1,809 medium to
small HSAs that are not currently included in the sample
used in table 4.30 Our model also does a good job in the
out-of-sample prediction. Appendix table A2 presents the
comparison between the implied and the observed outcomes
in the out-of-sample markets.
C. Counterfactual Analyses
Our counterfactual experiment is motivated by policy
debates on how to curb the rapid growth of dialysis expendi-
ture. In 2011, Medicare started to implement a new bundled
dialysis payment system that incorporates the formerly sep-
arate billable items into a new bundled flat rate.31 This
effectively lowers the dialysis providers’ margin per treat-
ment. To capture this policy effect, let λ be a multiplication
factor for variable profits and Δ for the costs.
The counterfactual payoffs under the alternative profit and
cost factors are
Πi = λKi(xβi +
∑
j =i
γi,jEεj [Kj(x, εj) | x] − εi)
−Δ(aiK2i + biKi). (12)
As shown in section III, under the scale normalization ai =
1/2, the counterfactual equilibrium choices of capacity for
provider i (denoted by ˜Ki) must satisfy
˜Ki(x, εi) = max
⎧⎨⎩0, λΔ⎛⎝xβi +∑
j =i
γi,jEεj [ ˜Kj(x, εj) | x] − εi
⎞⎠− bi
⎫⎬⎭ .
(13)
30 These markets are used to perform robustness analysis in panel A of
appendix A1. There are 3,129–1,320 = 1,809 markets, where, 1,320 is the
number of markets in the sample used in table 4.
31 The new system also incorporates some pay-for-performance incen-
tives. Penalties will be imposed on providers whose dialysis quality
measures (patients’ hemoglobin and urea levels) did not meet standards.
The maximum payment reduction is up to 2%. We did not explicitly inves-
tigate the pay-for-performance incentive in our analysis for two reasons.
First, the incentive is relatively small. Second, several papers (Grieco &
McDevitt, 2014; Cutler et al., 2012) find that dialysis quality is not sensitive
to competition.
For all i, let ϕ˜i = Eεi( ˜Ki(x, εi) | x) be the expected coun-
terfactual capacity defined by the following equilibrium
condition:
ϕ˜i = Φ
(
xβi +∑j =i γi,jϕ˜j − bi Δλ
σi
)
∗ λ
Δ
∗
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩xβi +
∑
j =i
γi,jϕ˜j − biΔ
λ
+ σi
φ
(
xβi+
∑
j =i γi,j ϕ˜j−bi Δλ
σi
)
Φ
(
xβi+
∑
j =i γi,j ϕ˜j−bi Δλ
σi
)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ . (14)
The predictions reported in table 6 are for the status quo
in data (when λ = 1,Δ = 1). If the costs per unit in capac-
ity increase by 20% and variable profits per unit incapacity
decrease by 10%, the counterfactual capacity distribution is
obtained by adjusting λ
Δ
= 0.91.2 = 0.75 in equation (14).
A similar counterfactual was applied by Schaumans and
Verboven (2008) to investigate the market for health care pro-
fessionals. According to MedPAC, the base composite rate
under the old system is about $142 per patient in 2012 (after
excluding the $20 drug add-on payment). Since the separate
billable drugs account for approximately 40% of total Medi-
care payment for dialysis, this leads to an estimated average
of $257 per treatment payment. Given the new composite
payment base rate of $235 in the same year, there is approxi-
mately a 5% reduction in the per patient payment. Due to the
lack of detailed data on patient-level payments and costs, we
cannot precisely measure the reduction on the per patient mar-
gin as a result of the reduction in the payment rate. Instead, we
qualitatively investigate the new policy by lowering λ
Δ
to dif-
ferent levels.32 In table 7, we report the predicted equilibrium
outcome when λ
Δ
is reduced by 2%, 5%, and 8%. Possibilities
also remain that the margin goes up for facilities that do not
rely too much on separate billable drugs. We also simulate
the outcome when λ
Δ
increases by 2%. Finally, we simulate
the heterogeneous response to the policy reform by adjusting
λ
Δ
= 98% for DaVita while holding the ratio λ
Δ
constant for
other providers. This is motivated by the established fact that
DaVita relies heavily on drug revenues.
Table 7 presents predicted results for different counter-
factual scenarios based on our GMM estimates.33 The first
32 While it is clear that λ/Δ is closely related to the Medicare payment
rate, the exact mapping between the two λ/Δ is not transparent due to
our model specifications and, in particular, the lack of facility-level data.
If facility-level data are available, one could regress the imputed provider
profits implied by our model against the observed facility profits, come up
with a factor that relates the model implied margin to the observed margin,
and use this factor to infer the magnitude of the change in λ/Δ as a result
from the new policy. Our counterfactual analysis qualitatively investigates
the effect of the new policy by lowering λ/Δ to various levels.
33 Both the two-stage and maximum likelihood estimates give predictions
that are very similar to the GMM estimates. To economize on space, we
report in this paper only the results obtained from the GMM estimates.
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Table 7.—Counterfactual Capacity Distribution
E(Capacity) Pr(Entry) E(Capacity | Entry)
FMC DaVita Nonchain FMC DaVita Nonchain FMC DaVita Nonchain
λ/Δ 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
25th 2.10 0.16 1.91 0.18 0.08 0.16 11.6 11.4 12.0
50th 4.76 3.06 4.19 0.34 0.21 0.29 14.1 14.3 14.3
75th 8.50 6.11 7.18 0.50 0.36 0.43 17.0 17.1 16.7
Mean 6.06 4.23 5.08 0.35 0.24 0.30 14.6 14.5 14.5
SD 5.33 4.46 4.16 0.21 0.18 0.18 4.45 4.44 3.81
Total 8,237 5,473 6,774 321 131 210 19,286 19,084 19,099
λ/Δ 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98%
25th 1.36 0.57 1.03 0.13 0.05 0.10 10.4 10.4 10.5
50th 3.54 2.45 2.62 0.28 0.18 0.21 12.8 13.4 12.6
75th 6.70 5.91 4.81 0.43 0.36 0.33 15.4 16.6 14.6
Mean 4.60 4.00 3.34 0.29 0.23 0.23 13.1 13.8 12.4
SD 4.20 4.59 2.99 0.20 0.19 0.16 3.80 4.67 3.17
Total 6,069 5,280 4,408 218 141 72 17,335 18,237 16,679
λ/Δ 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
25th 0.60 0.20 0.30 0.06 0.22 0.04 8.81 8.84 8.62
50th 1.90 1.40 1.10 0.18 0.12 0.10 10.9 11.8 10.3
75th 4.30 4.50 2.40 0.32 0.30 0.20 13.2 15.1 12.0
Mean 2.8 3.1 1.6 0.21 0.18 0.13 11.1 12.3 10.3
SD 2.80 4.20 1.70 0.17 0.19 0.11 9.59 4.58 2.47
Total 3,727 4,135 2,116 90 115 8 14,666 16,288 13,642
λ/Δ 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92%
25th 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 7.36 7.38 7.08
50th 0.83 0.55 0.33 0.09 0.06 0.04 9.10 9.84 8.41
75th 2.39 2.57 0.95 0.21 0.20 0.10 11.1 12.9 9.82
Mean 1.56 2.01 0.65 0.13 0.13 0.06 9.31 10.5 8.45
SD 1.84 3.16 0.83 0.13 0.16 0.07 2.57 4.06 1.95
Total 2,060 2,650 859 10 61 0 12,299 13,885 11,156
λ/Δ 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102%
25th 2.99 1.25 3.17 0.24 0.10 0.23 12.7 12.2 13.5
50th 6.09 3.32 6.30 0.40 0.22 0.39 15.4 14.8 16.3
75th 10.5 5.76 10.3 0.56 0.34 0.53 18.6 17.0 19.2
Mean 7.69 4.14 7.37 0.41 0.34 0.38 16.2 14.8 16.6
SD 6.55 4.07 5.60 0.22 0.16 0.21 5.21 4.03 4.63
Total 10,148 5,470 9,722 446 86 406 21,330 19,521 21,917
λ/Δ 100% 98% 100% 100% 98% 100% 100% 98% 100%
25th 2.20 0.40 1.97 0.19 0.04 0.16 11.7 9.92 12.0
50th 5.24 1.43 4.38 0.36 0.12 0.30 14.5 12.1 14.5
75th 9.91 2.82 7.61 0.55 0.20 0.45 18.0 13.8 17.1
Mean 6.89 1.84 5.41 0.38 0.13 0.31 15.2 11.8 14.7
SD 6.24 1.77 4.53 0.23 0.10 0.19 5.09 2.76 4.05
Total 9,095 2,427 7,138 403 6 251 20,100 15,610 19,440
Number of observations: 1,320. Under status quo, λ/Δ = 100% for all providers. The 25th, 50th, and 75th rows report the corresponding quartile of distributions. The mean capacity row reports the average expected
capacity across markets. The total capacity row reports the sum of expected capacity across markets. The mean entry row reports the average entry probability across markets. The total entry probability row reports
the total number of markets with high entry probability (i.e., entry probability greater than 0.5).
three columns for E(Capacity) give summary statistics (the
mean, the quartiles, and the standard deviation) of the empir-
ical distribution of expected equilibrium capacities predicted
for each market. The two other main columns, E(Entry) and
E(Capacity | Entry), present summary statistics from the pre-
dicted distribution of counterfactual entry probabilities, as
well as the expected capacity choice conditional on entry for
each provider.
For each provider, the quartiles and the mean under the
new policy are almost always decreasing in the ratio exper-
imented with. For example, for FMC, the median of the
expected equilibrium choices of capacity predicted for 1,320
markets in the data is 4.76 for the status quo (λ/Δ = 100%)
but decreases to 3.54 or 0.83 when λ/Δ = 98% or 92%.
The same pattern shows up for the other providers uniformly
across all ratios experimented with. This seems to suggest that
the counterfactual distribution of expected capacity choices
is stochastically decreasing in the size of the reduction in the
ratio λ/Δ. This conforms with the intuition that providers
reduce their capacity choices in response to reductions in the
margin.
The magnitudes of changes in response to the adjusted
margins, however, are heterogeneous across providers. The
size of capacity changes at DaVita and FMC are less drastic
than that for nonchain providers. For example, for nonchain
providers, the median of the expected capacity increases from
4.19 to 6.30 when the ratio λ/Δ increases from the status quo
to 102% and reduces to 0.33 when the ratio drops to 92%. In
comparison, for DaVita, the median of the expected capacity
increases from 3.06 to 3.32 when the ratio λ/Δ increases
from the status quo to 102% and reduces to 0.55 when the
markup ratio drops to 92%. This seems to suggest the local
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independent and nonchain providers are affected the most
by a policy reform that reduces the margin for all providers
uniformly by the same proportion.
Another finding from our estimates is that the capacity
adjustment of DaVita tends to be negatively correlated with
that of FMC. In fact, DaVita increases its capacity stock in
108 markets when λ
Δ
= 95%. This pattern could be ascribed
to the downward-sloping reaction curve that results from the
strategic interactions in capacity choices. When a competitor
reduces its capacity, the downward-sloping reaction curve
incentivizes a provider to increase its capacity. It also helps
to mitigate the negative impact on providers’ capacity choices
and market presence when there are negative profit shocks.
The entry probabilities respond in a similar manner when
the margin for all providers decreases by the same propor-
tion. Nonchain providers respond more strongly than FMC
and DaVita. Though the average entry probability for DaVita
decreases unambiguously with a lower profit-to-cost ratio λ
Δ
,
the number of markets with high entry probability increases
substantially for DaVita when λ
Δ
= 98%. Nevertheless, when
the ratio is reduced further to λ
Δ
= 95%, the number of such
markets with high entry probabilities is remarkably lower
than that under the status quo for DaVita.34
Since the policy reform can imply a positive profit shock
for providers that are less reliant on drug revenues, we also
investigate the outcome when λ
Δ
= 102% for all providers.
FMC responds with more substantial increase in its capacity
than nonchain and DaVita. All in all, when the providers share
the same market-wise profit shocks (such as a reduction in
the margin induced by the new payment policy), DaVita is
expected to be more resistant to negative profit shocks and less
responsive to positive profit shocks. This may arise from the
asymmetries in providers’ profit and cost structures, as well
as the difference in their strategic responses to their rivals’
capacity choices.
We then study the predictions under a provider-specific
policy reform where there is a negative profit shock for DaVita
and no shocks for FMC and the nonchain providers. Specif-
ically, we set λ
Δ
= 0.98 for DaVita and λ
Δ
= 1 for FMC
and nonchain providers.35 Our model predicts that DaVita
reduces capacity stock substantially, while both rivals slightly
increase their capacities. The negative profit shock for DaVita
is magnified by the downward-sloping reaction curve. When
34 The counterfactual analysis in table 7 also suggests that a small decrease
in margin could induce significant reduction in capacity choices and entry
probabilities. This is probably because even a small percentage reduction
in markup on each dialysis station could sum up to a significant amount
given that an average facility owns eighteen to twenty stations. Another
possible explanation of the large estimated effect of the policy change is
that in most markets in our data, the markups are quite high (the differences
between variable profits and fixed costs are reasonably large) so that a
small discrepancy in the change of λ andΔwould affect the profitability of
providers nontrivially. This effect is also compounded through the strategic
interactions between providers.
35 As we explained previously, this is motivated by the observation that
DaVita relies heavily on drug revenue. In 2007, the New York Times (Pollack,
2007) reported that 40% of DaVita’s revenue comes from dialysis-related
drugs. In comparison, 25% of FMC’s revenue depends on drugs.
the margin decreases, a direct response for DaVita is to reduce
capacity. This motivates both FMC and nonchain to increase
their capacity through the reaction curve, which serves as
an additional incentive for DaVita to reduce capacity in the
new equilibrium. Overall, our model suggests that with the
downward-sloping reaction curve, even a seemingly small
asymmetric profit shock could induce significant changes in
dialysis providers’ capacity choices.
We also report outcomes of counterfactual experiments for
markets with a different population and prevalence rates of
diabetes. Table 8 presents the mean and the standard devi-
ation of counterfactual expected capacity choices and entry
probabilities in heterogeneous groups of markets with dif-
ferent population or prevalence rates of diabetes. Our goal
is to learn about the distribution of counterfactual distribu-
tions of expected capacity choices and entry probabilities
in different markets if Medicare were to adopt discrimina-
tory reimbursement policies based on these observed market
attributes.
We continue to find heterogeneity across FMC, DaVita,
and nonchain providers in their responses to margin reduc-
tions conditional on market characteristics. In addition, there
is strong evidence that responses differ substantially across
markets with different population or diabetes prevalence
rates. For instance, if the profit margins measured by λ/Δ are
reduced by 2% for markets with population above the median,
then the average of expected capacity choices in equilibrium
will be reduced to 6.92, 6.76, and 5.32 for FMC, DaVita,
and nonchain providers, respectively. In this case, the aver-
age expected capacity choices will be reduced to 2.32, 1.29,
and 1.39, respectively, in markets with a population below
the median.
It is also worth noting that other things being equal, the
counterfactual distributions of expected choices of capac-
ity and entry probabilities in markets with higher population
or diabetes prevalence rates stochastically dominate those in
markets with lower population or prevalence rates. This pat-
tern could be explained by the fact that profits from markets
with larger consumer bases respond more dramatically to
changes in profit margins.
VII. Conclusion
Dialysis providers in the United States usually choose
the scale of their operation (as measured by the number of
dialysis stations) when they start to serve a market. Such
capacity choices rarely change after the initial entry and
vary substantially across providers and markets. To capture
these empirical regularities, we propose a structural model of
Bayesian games with continuous actions and use it to estimate
providers’ payoff structure and, in particular, the strategic
interaction between providers’ capacity choices. We estimate
the model using several estimators, including a GMM estima-
tor that fully exploits the structural relationship. We use the
estimates to investigate counterfactual policy interventions
that change providers’ profit margins per unit in capacity.
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Table 8.—Counterfactual Capacity Distribution by Market Types
E(Capacity) Pr(Entry) E(Capacity | Entry)
Market FMC DaVita Nonchain FMC DaVita Nonchain FMC DaVita Nonchain
λ/Δ 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
pop below 50% Mean 3.30 1.62 2.36 0.23 0.11 0.17 12.2 11.6 11.9
SD 3.42 1.81 1.97 0.17 0.11 0.12 3.30 2.90 2.52
pop above 50% Mean 8.87 6.89 7.84 0.48 0.36 0.43 17.1 17.4 17.1
SD 5.45 4.78 3.97 0.18 0.16 0.14 4.06 3.76 3.05
db rate below 50% Mean 4.10 3.69 5.07 0.27 0.21 0.30 13.0 13.7 14.4
SD 3.52 4.37 4.43 0.18 0.19 0.20 3.35 4.56 4.04
db rate above 50% Mean 7.99 4.76 5.08 0.43 0.27 0.31 16.2 15.2 14.5
SD 6.05 4.50 3.89 0.22 0.17 0.17 4.78 4.19 3.56
λ/Δ 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98% 98%
pop below 50% Mean 2.32 1.29 1.39 0.17 0.09 0.12 10.9 10.7 10.5
SD 2.62 1.69 1.31 0.15 0.10 0.09 2.88 2.90 2.15
pop above 50% Mean 6.92 6.76 5.32 0.41 0.36 0.34 15.4 17.0 14.8
SD 4.23 4.95 2.91 0.16 0.17 0.13 3.24 3.94 2.43
db rate below 50% Mean 3.11 3.30 3.30 0.22 0.19 0.22 11.8 12.9 12.5
SD 2.86 4.24 3.16 0.16 0.19 0.17 3.05 4.61 3.35
db rate above 50% Mean 6.06 4.69 3.38 0.36 0.26 0.23 14.5 14.7 12.8
SD 4.75 4.81 2.81 0.20 0.19 0.15 3.99 4.55 2.99
λ/Δ 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
pop below 50% Mean 1.22 0.77 0.54 0.11 0.06 0.05 9.17 9.26 8.60
SD 1.63 1.33 0.62 0.11 0.09 0.05 2.33 2.69 1.69
pop above 50% Mean 4.46 5.54 2.69 0.31 0.31 0.21 13.1 15.5 12.1
SD 2.88 4.66 1.72 0.15 0.18 0.10 2.46 3.93 1.80
db rate below 50% Mean 1.88 2.39 1.55 0.15 0.15 0.12 10.1 11.3 10.2
SD 2.00 3.53 1.75 0.13 0.17 0.12 2.64 4.31 2.58
db rate above 50% Mean 3.75 3.86 1.65 0.26 0.22 0.13 12.1 13.3 10.5
SD 3.21 4.59 1.60 0.18 0.20 0.11 3.17 4.63 2.34
λ/Δ 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92%
pop below 50% Mean 0.54 0.36 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.02 7.65 7.80 7.07
SD 0.90 0.85 0.23 0.07 0.06 0.02 1.85 2.28 1.31
pop above 50% Mean 2.60 3.68 1.15 0.21 0.23 0.11 11.0 13.3 9.86
SD 1.97 3.73 0.91 0.13 0.17 0.07 2.05 3.56 1.40
db rate below 50% Mean 0.99 1.43 0.62 0.09 0.10 0.06 8.49 9.59 8.28
SD 1.27 2.49 0.85 0.10 0.14 0.07 2.24 3.71 2.01
db rate above 50% Mean 2.12 2.58 0.69 0.17 0.16 0.07 10.1 11.4 8.62
SD 2.12 3.62 0.80 0.14 0.18 0.07 2.63 4.18 1.87
λ/Δ 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102% 102%
pop below 50% Mean 4.46 1.88 3.72 0.28 0.13 0.24 13.5 12.3 13.5
SD 4.31 1.84 2.81 0.19 0.10 0.14 3.79 2.79 2.96
pop above 50% Mean 10.97 6.45 11.08 0.53 0.34 0.53 18.9 17.3 19.7
SD 6.82 4.41 5.28 0.18 0.14 0.15 5.04 3.47 3.90
db rate below 50% Mean 5.20 3.79 7.44 0.32 0.22 0.38 14.2 14.2 16.6
SD 4.30 4.06 5.99 0.19 0.17 0.22 3.75 4.23 4.94
db rate above 50% Mean 10.13 4.49 7.29 0.49 0.26 0.39 18.1 15.3 16.6
SD 7.41 4.05 5.18 0.22 0.15 0.19 5.69 3.75 4.31
λ/Δ 100% 98% 100% 100% 98% 100% 100% 98% 100%
pop below 50% Mean 3.54 0.74 2.44 0.24 0.06 0.18 12.3 9.97 12.0
SD 3.80 0.84 2.05 0.18 0.06 0.12 3.56 2.20 2.58
pop above 50% Mean 10.30 2.95 8.43 0.52 0.20 0.45 18.2 13.7 17.5
SD 6.41 1.77 4.35 0.19 0.09 0.15 4.74 1.84 3.30
db rate below 50% Mean 4.67 1.65 5.42 0.29 0.12 0.31 13.4 11.4 14.7
SD 4.30 1.83 4.85 0.20 0.11 0.21 3.87 2.98 4.32
db rate above 50% Mean 9.07 2.02 5.39 0.46 0.15 0.32 17.0 12.3 14.8
SD 7.04 1.69 4.19 0.23 0.10 0.18 5.49 2.43 3.76
Rows with “pop below 50%” and “pop above 50%” report estimates using samples with markets whose population is below or above the median, respectively. Rows with “db rates below 50%” and “db rate above
50%” report estimates using samples with markets whose diabetes prevalence rates are above or below the median.
Our estimates suggest that the strategic interaction between
providers leads to a downward-sloping reaction curve in
capacity choices. A dialysis provider’s choice of capacity
decreases with that of competitors. A 1 unit increase in
the expected capacity of a competitor reduces a provider’s
entry probability rather substantially. This suggests that
conventional models of binary entry decisions would over-
look the heterogeneity of strategic effects on providers’
capacity choices and market presence. Our counterfactual
analyses suggest that providers’ responses to payment poli-
cies are heterogeneous and the strategic interaction between
the choices of capacity plays a significant part in determining
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these responses. Our econometric method is also of interest in
its own right and can be applied to a wider class of Bayesian
games with continuous choices.
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APPENDIX A
Supplemental Tables
Table A1.—Additional Robustness
FMC DaVita Nonchain
EST SE EST SE EST SE
Panel Aa
Kfmc −0.82 0.17∗∗∗
Kdav −1.14 0.20∗∗∗ −0.88 0.17∗∗∗
Knonchain −1.18 0.29∗∗∗ −0.60 0.28∗∗ −0.55 0.18∗∗∗
lpop 25.1 1.64∗∗∗ 19.7 1.77∗∗∗ 20.7 1.48∗∗∗
black 51.5 15.1∗∗∗ 9.54 12.4 0.76 11.7
white 10.1 15.2 −17.6 11.8 −23.3 11.4∗∗
latino 26.5 6.98∗∗∗ 3.23 7.85 14.8 6.92∗∗
asian −85.2 33.1∗∗∗ 7.93 29.2 −0.75 27.0
age1 28.1 36.8 −60.9 38.2 −39.5 36.1
age2 38.1 33.3 −54.1 34.2 −20.4 31.9
age3 36.0 32.8 −20.4 34.7 24.7 32.1
neph 2.23 0.55∗∗∗ 2.54 0.59∗∗∗ 1.32 0.59∗∗
lbed 5.53 3.08∗ −2.14 3.32 6.12 3.11∗∗
rn 10.4 3.47∗∗∗ 6.35 3.69∗ 3.59 3.47
dbrate 1.67 0.64∗∗∗ 1.13 0.69 0.59 0.66
conreg −3.42 1.56∗∗ −2.37 1.70 −3.68 1.59∗∗
NE −7.63 3.87∗∗ −12.4 4.07∗∗∗ 7.76 3.64∗∗
MW −6.10 2.18∗∗∗ −3.09 2.36 −1.94 2.26
West −10.0 3.64∗∗∗ −15.0 4.10∗∗∗ 11.8 3.11∗∗∗
dfmc 13.1 8.44 14.9 8.79∗ 33.1 8.17∗∗∗
dfmc2 −3.53 2.82 −2.16 2.94 −12.5 2.57∗∗∗
ddav 2.38 11.5 −21.5 11.6∗ 58.7 11.0∗∗∗
ddav2 0.35 5.69 15.4 5.72∗∗∗ −26.0 5.45∗∗∗
cons −358 35.8∗∗∗ −192 35.9∗∗∗ −260 31.0∗∗∗
sigma 23.0 0.71∗∗∗ 23.5 0.83∗∗∗ 23.0 0.75∗∗∗
Number of
observations 3,129
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Table A1.—(Continued)
FMC DaVita Nonchain
EST SE EST SE EST SE
Panel Bb
Kfmc −0.69 0.17∗∗∗
Kdav −0.84 0.16∗∗∗ −0.64 0.16∗∗∗
Knonchain −0.92 0.25∗∗∗ −0.22 0.25 −0.35 0.15∗∗
lpop 25.1 1.58∗∗∗ 19.6 1.83∗∗∗ 20.5 1.48∗∗∗
black 58.7 16.2∗∗∗ 10.0 13.0 −1.53 12.1
white 15.0 16.2 −20.3 12.6 −25.6 12.0∗∗
latino 26.3 7.02∗∗∗ −1.42 8.20 14.6 7.08∗∗
asian −72.2 32.3∗∗ 16.6 29.7 −2.27 27.6
age1 33.0 37.5 −65.2 40.1 −39.3 37.2
age2 36.1 34.2 −65.5 36.0∗ −24.6 33.0
age3 46.9 33.4 −20.4 36.3 27.7 33.0
neph 1.98 0.57∗∗∗ 2.50 0.63∗∗∗ 1.14 0.61∗
lbed 6.86 3.16∗∗ −2.76 3.50 7.04 3.20∗∗
rn 10.3 3.54∗∗∗ 6.62 3.87∗ 3.02 3.58
dbrate 1.47 0.65∗∗ 0.89 0.72 0.27 0.68
conreg −3.76 1.60∗∗ −2.59 1.78 −3.88 1.63∗∗
NE −10.2 3.95∗∗∗ −17.3 4.22∗∗∗ 9.05 3.72∗∗
MW −6.23 2.19∗∗∗ −3.46 2.43 −1.18 2.29
West −10.8 3.65∗∗∗ −16.6 4.29∗∗∗ 13.2 3.20∗∗∗
dfmc 7.29 8.36 10.3 9.02 34.2 8.18∗∗∗
dfmc2 −1.83 2.80 −0.64 3.04 −13.1 2.59∗∗∗
ddav −1.29 11.4 −29.0 12.0∗∗ 61.9 11.2∗∗∗
ddav2 1.22 5.64 19.4 5.87∗∗∗ −27.3 5.52∗∗∗
cons −360 36.3∗∗∗ −177 37.1∗∗∗ −257 31.4∗∗∗
sigma 23.9 0.71∗∗∗ 25.0 0.83∗∗∗ 24.1 0.76∗∗∗
Number of
observations 3,204
Panel Cc
Kfmc −0.75 0.23∗∗∗
Kdav −1.46 0.28∗∗∗ −1.05 0.23∗∗∗
Knonchain −1.45 0.37∗∗∗ −0.93 0.37∗∗ −0.93 0.28∗∗∗
lpop 21.6 1.61∗∗∗ 17.0 1.79∗∗∗ 18.6 1.45∗∗∗
black 42.4 13.0∗∗∗ 8.45 11.9 4.78 10.9
white 4.95 13.1 −13.4 11.2 −20.7 10.6∗
latino 19.4 6.59∗∗∗ −1.22 8.04 5.67 7.13
asian −77.3 31.6∗∗ 32.4 29.2 −1.86 26.8
age1 22.4 34.3 −78.1 38.1∗∗ −47.4 35.9
age2 21.6 30.7 −69.7 33.1∗∗ −26.1 30.7
age3 32.1 30.6 −26.4 34.4 12.9 31.6
neph 2.26 0.50∗∗∗ 2.16 0.59∗∗∗ 1.41 0.57∗∗
lbed 4.17 2.86 −4.25 3.30 4.41 2.99
rn 8.68 3.23∗∗∗ 6.70 3.61∗ 3.26 3.35
dbrate 1.52 0.59∗∗∗ 1.15 0.69∗ 0.75 0.65
conreg −2.79 1.46∗ −1.60 1.69 −3.70 1.54∗∗
NE −9.05 3.67∗∗ −11.3 4.15∗∗∗ 3.77 3.73
MW −6.49 2.03∗∗∗ −4.47 2.34∗ −1.43 2.23
West −6.85 3.57∗ −11.1 4.14∗∗∗ 11.5 3.03∗∗∗
dfmc 8.99 7.98 16.8 8.85∗ 24.6 8.40∗∗∗
dfmc2 −2.80 2.64 −3.83 2.94 −9.58 2.60∗∗∗
ddav −3.53 10.4 −19.5 11.2∗ 43.8 10.5∗∗∗
Table A1.—(Continued)
FMC DaVita Nonchain
EST SE EST SE EST SE
ddav2 2.82 5.28 13.5 5.55∗∗ −19.1 5.29∗∗∗
cons −293 32.9∗∗∗ −151 35.0∗∗∗ −218 29.3∗∗∗
sigma 20.2 0.70∗∗∗ 21.9 0.87∗∗∗ 21.1 0.77∗∗∗
Number of
observations 2,930
***p < 1%, **p < 5%, *p < 10%. Results are obtained using a two-stage estimator, and standard
errors are computed based on 300 bootstraps. This table displays the estimates under alternative sampling
criteria. These results are quantitatively similar to those in our main specification.
aBased on a sample of 3,129 markets where only large markets with capacity greater than 60 are
dropped.
bBased on alternative cutoffs when markets with capactiy greater than 80 are dropped. The market
capacity of 80 corresponds to approximately the 95th percentile in capacity distribution.
cBased on alternative cutoffs when markets with capacity greater than 40 are dropped. The market
capacity of 40 corresponds to the 85th percentile in capacity distribution.
Table A2.—Model Fit: Out-of-Sample Prediction
Observed Predicted
FMC DaVita Nonchain FMC DaVita Nonchain
A. Capacity E(K|x)
Mean 2.84 2.53 2.55 3.43 2.16 2.36
SD 7.57 7.06 7.02 4.96 4.12 3.49
B. Entry Pr(K > 0)
Mean 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.12 0.15
SD 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.21 0.17 0.17
Number of markets 1,809
The prediction is made based on the GMM estimates reported in table 4 and the larger sample used for
panel A of table A1. We report the results after excluding 1,320 markets that are currently included in the
main specifications. This left 3,129–1,320 = 1,809 markets.
APPENDIX B
Proof of Proposition 1
First, suppose that the solution of the maximization problem is in the
interior: K∗i (X, εi) > 0. Then the first-order condition of equation (2)
implies that in equilibrium,
K∗i (X, εi) = 12ai
⎧⎨⎩Xβi +∑j =i γi,jEεj
[
K∗j (X, εj)|x, εi
]− bi − εi
⎫⎬⎭ , (A1)
where the right-hand side of equation (A1) is necessarily strictly positive.
Since ai > 0, the second-order condition for such an interior solution
would be satisfied automatically. Next, suppose the solution is on the
corner: K∗i (X, εi) = 0. Because ai > 0 and Πi(0, K−i, x, εi) = 0 regardless
of K−i, the first-order condition of equation (2) evaluated at K∗i (X , εi) = 0
and the competitors’ strategies K∗−i(.) is necessarily negative. (Otherwise the
solution would be interior.) Therefore, with a corner solution in equilibrium,
we have
K∗i (X, εi) = 0 and Xβi +
∑
j =i
γi,jEεj
[
K∗j (X, εj)|x, εi
]− bi − εi < 0.
(A2)
Combining equations (A1) and (A2), we conclude that equation (3) holds
in any PSBNE.
